Crabb v Arun District Council 1976 Ch 179 361

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The inquirer bought land with a predetermined number of passages. The respondent position put doors at the passages, and a casual plan was reached by which the inquirer would have the option to continue to utilize the passageways. The petitioner sold piece of his property, leaving him totally dependent on one of the passageways to get to the rest of. The respondent supplanted the door with a fence, and would not open the passage.


Regularly for a guarantee to be restricting, an agreement should be set up. Here, there was no agreement in light of the fact that the guarantee was unwarranted: there was no thought. The issue for this situation was whether the guarantee might be restricting without thought.


The Court of Appeal held that the guarantee was enforceable under the tenet of 'exclusive estoppel'. This convention applies where it would be discriminatory for the respondent to demand its severe legitimate rights to renege on the plan. Imbalance emerges where the litigant has guaranteed that the petitioner will have a restrictive interest knowing or proposing that the inquirer will follow up on it, and where the petitioner has followed up on it. The applicable guarantee can be made by one or the other words or lead.

For this situation, while there was no firm confirmation that the petitioner could utilize the passageway, the board's lead (setting up a door and leaving it open for a long time) hardened the inquirer's assumption. The chamber knew that the petitioner planned to sell a bit of the land and would be dependent on the passage, yet never really clarify him of the conviction that he reserved a privilege to it. A restrictive estoppel emerged.