Difference between revisions of "SIRAJUL & ORS. v. THE STATE OF U.P. & ANR"

From Advocatespedia, ASSN: 143625
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page with "SIRAJUL & ORS VS THE STATE OF U.P & ANR (SC), 2015 THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SIRAJUL & ORS………………………………………APPELLANT(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P &...")
 
(No difference)

Latest revision as of 20:37, 2 August 2020

SIRAJUL & ORS VS THE STATE OF U.P & ANR (SC), 2015

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SIRAJUL & ORS………………………………………APPELLANT(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P & ANR…………………………RESPONDENT(s) Dated: 6th July, 2015 Bench: Adarsh Kumar Goel,J

FACTS: The incident in question took place in the year 1992. In respect of the said incident, there were two cross cases under Section 307IPC registered against the appellants, and Crime Case under Section 307IPC registered at the instance of the appellants. The investigating Agency charge sheeted respondent No.2. After trial, respondent No.2 and three others were convicted under Section 307/34IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-by Additional Sessions Judge. Respondent No.2, in his statement under Section 313Cr.P.C. stated that he had also lodged a cross case. He also led defence evidence in support of the cross version. Having regard to the nature of injuries received on the side of the appellants and other evidence, version of the appellants was accepted and respondent No.2 and two others were convicted. The hon’ble Supreme Court observed that respondent No.2 had registered a Crime Case against the appellants and no action was taken thereon, he kept quiet till about 16 yrs. Meanwhile, respondent No.2 and other co-accused were charge sheeted and session trial commenced against them. It was only after 16 yrs. that respondent No.2 filed an application for summoning progress report of the said Crime Case, so that the cross case against the appellants could also be tried along with the trial against respondent No.2.The respondent No.2 filed the impugned complaint alleging that the appellants had committed offence under Section 307IPC. The said complaint led to summoning of the appellants which was impugned before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellants for quashing on the ground that allegation in the complaint and preliminary evidence led in support thereof made out a case for summoning and thus no case for quashing was made out. Having regard to the nature of allegations and entirety of circumstances, the Court held that it will be unfair and unjust to permit respondent No.2 to proceed with a complaint filed 16 years after the incident against the appellants. The appeal was allowed and the proceedings were quashed.

JUDGMENT: 1. The appellants have called in question the order dated 6th July, 2009 of the High Court of Sirajul & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. (SC) 2015(II) Judicature, Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.2428 of 2009. Thereby, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of summoning and to quash the complaint dated 3rd May, 2008 registered as Criminal Complaint Case No.1066 of 2008 under Section 307of the Indian Penal Code, P.S. Atrauli, District Hardoi, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-II, Hardoi. According to the appellants, the complaint and the proceedings were gross abuse of process of the Court having been filed after gross delay of 16 years after the incident. 2. The incident in question took place on 11th February, 1992. In respect of the said incident, there were two cross cases being Crime Case No.37/92 under Section 307IPC registered against the appellants, and Crime Case No.37A/92 under Section 307IPC registered at the instance of the appellants at Police Station Atrauli, District Hardoi. The investigating Agency charge sheeted respondent No.2, which gave rise to Session Trial Case No.760 of 1995. After trial, respondent No.2 and three others were convicted under Section 307/34IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-each vide judgment dated 23rd September, 2009 by Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-I, Hardoi. However, an appeal against the said judgment is said to be pending. Respondent No.2, in his statement under Section 313Cr.P.C. stated that he had also lodged a cross case. He also led defence evidence in support of the cross version. Having regard to the nature of injuries received on the side of the appellants and other evidence, version of the appellants was accepted and respondent No.2 and two others were convicted. 3. What is significant and undisputed is the fact that however respondent No.2 had enrolled Crime Case No.37/92 on 11th February, 1992 against the appellants and no move was made subsequently, he stayed silent till eleventh August, 2005. Then, respondent No.2 and other co-denounced were charge sheeted on 21st January, 1993 and meeting preliminary started against them in the year 1995. It was distinctly on eleventh August, 2005 that respondent No.2 documented an application for calling progress report of Crime Case No.37/1992, so the cross body of evidence against the appellants could likewise be attempted alongside the preliminary against respondent No.2. 4. Instance of respondent No.2 is that no organization was passed on the application yet it was uniquely on first February, 2008 that respondent No.2 recorded another application. There is nothing to show if some other advance was taken by respondent No.2 with the exception of on 11th August, 2005 and 1st February, 2008. 5. Application documented on 1st February, 2008 was discarded on twentieth February, 2008 taking into account the report of the police that the appellants were excused during examination and the report was recorded under the steady gaze of the Court. On 3rd May, 2008, respondent No.2 recorded the criticized grievance charging that the appellants had submitted offense under Section 307IPC on 11th February, 1992. The said grievance prompted gathering of the appellants vide request dated third June, 2009 which was denounced under the steady gaze of the High Court. The High Court excused the request documented by the appellants for subduing on the ground that claim in the grievance and starter proof drove in help thereof presented out a defense for calling and consequently no case for suppress was made out. 6. We host heard educated advice for the gatherings and examined the record. 7. While giving notification on 23rd November, 2009 further continuing in Criminal Case No.1066 of 2008 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-II, Hardoi was stayed and the said request has been employable till date. 8. Fundamental conflict raised in the interest of the appellants is that the reprimanded protest has been documented 16 years after the occurrence and for 13 and a half years after the episode, respondent No.2 didn't seek after the make a difference. It is along these lines presented that since the complainant stayed silent for a long time after the episode and the objection has been documented following 16 years, respondent No.2 having been indicted in the cross case, the arraignment of the appellants at this stage will be out of line and useless. 9. Then again, respondent No.2-complainant presented that bar of restriction doesn't make a difference past the legal bar under Section 468Cr.P.C. A wrongdoing never passes on. A criminal offense is a wrong against the general public despite the fact that carried out against an individual and accordingly the indictment can't be tossed out only on the ground of deferral. On the side of this accommodation, dependence has been set in Japani Sahoo versus Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394. 10. In response to this stand of the complainant, learned counsel for the charged/accused presented that regardless of whether it is accepted that the appellants had caused the injury being referred to, the idea of injury, in the conditions can, best case scenario fall under Section 324 IPC in which case bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C. is relevant. Regardless, even cases not secured by legal bar of impediment could be held to be obligated to be suppressed on the ground of infringement of right of fast preliminary under Article 21 of the Constitution. 11. In Japani Sahoo (supra), it was observed:"Simultaneously, be that as it may, ground reality likewise can't be disregarded. Negligible deferral may not bar the privilege of the "Crown" in arraigning "hoodlums". In any case, it likewise can't be ignored that no individual can be held under constant misgiving that he can be indicted at "whenever" for "any wrongdoing" regardless of the nature or earnestness of the offense. "Individuals will have no genuine feelings of serenity if there is no time of constraint in any event, for negligible offences."In Vakil Prasad Singh versus Territory of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355,it was watched :" Time and again this Court has accentuated the requirement for quick examinations and preliminary as both are ordered by the letter and soul of the arrangements of CrPC [in specific, Sections 197,173,309,437(6) and 468, etc.] and the sacred assurance cherished in Article 21of the Constitution. Enlivened by the wide breadth and substance of Article 21 as deciphered by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Association of India[(1978) 1 SCC 248] and in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Province of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81]this Court had seen that Article 21 gives a principal directly on each individual not to be denied of his life or freedom aside from as indicated by system set up by law; that such technique isn't some similarity to a methodology yet the strategy ought to be "sensible, reasonable and only"; and there from streams, without question, the privilege to fast preliminary. It was additionally seen that: No strategy which doesn't guarantee a sensibly snappy preliminary can be viewed as 'sensible, reasonable or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21." The Court explained that expedient preliminary methods sensibly speedy preliminary which is a basic and basic piece of the major right to life and freedom revered in Article 21.

12. It is, in this way, all around settled that the privilege to expedient preliminary in every criminal abuse (sic indictments) is a basic right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This privilege is pertinent not exclusively to the real procedures in court yet in addition incorporates inside its breadth the first police examinations also. The privilege to rapid preliminary stretches out similarly to every single criminal arraignment and isn't kept to a specific classification of cases. For each situation, where the privilege to expedient preliminary is claimed to have been encroached, the court needs to play out the exercise in careful control after mulling over all the orderly conditions, listed above, and decide for each situation whether the privilege to fast preliminary has been denied in a given case."

13. In Sajjan Kumar versus CBI (2010) 9 SCC 368, considerably following 23 years of postponement in fulfillment of preliminary, procedures were not subdued and it was watched: "39. For the situation close by, however deferral might be an important ground, in the light of the materials which are accessible under the steady gaze of the Court through CBI, without testing the equivalent at the preliminary, the procedures can't be subdued simply on the ground of postponement. As expressed before, those materials must be tried with regards to preference to the denounced distinctly at the trial."16. In NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. versus NOIDA (2011) 6 SCC 508, even deferral of 17-18 years was held not to be sufficient to stop criminal procedures having respect to the gravity of offense, it was watched :"21. In this manner, it is clear that question of postponement in propelling criminal arraignment might be a situation to be thought about in showing up at an official choice, yet it can't itself be a ground for excusing the grievance. All the more along these lines, the issue of impediment must be analyzed in the light of the gravity of the charge.xxxx42. Taking into account the above mentioned, we are of the considered feeling that these claims being of an intense sort and as affirmed, Respondent 4 had passed orders in colourable exercise of intensity preferring himself and certain contractual workers, require examination. In this manner, taking into account the above mentioned, we direct CBI to have starter enquiry and in the event that the claims are found having some substance justifying further continuing with criminal arraignment, may continue as per law. It might be appropriate to make reference to that any perception made in this against Respondent 4 would be dealt with important to choose the current debate. CBI will explore the issue without being affected by any perception made in this judgment."

14. It is thus clear from the above observations that mere delay in completion of proceedings may not be by itself a ground to quash proceedings where offences are serious, but the Court having regard to the conduct of the parties, nature of offence and the extent of delay in the facts and circumstances of a given case, quash the proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court.

15. In the present case, conduct of the complainant can certainly be taken into account. Admittedly, the complainant stood convicted in a cross case. At least for ten years after commencement of the trial, the complainant did not even bother to seek simultaneous trial of the cross case, the step which was taken for the first time in the year 2005 which could certainly have been taken in the year 1995 itself when the trial against respondent No.2 commenced. Having regard to the nature of allegations and entirety of circumstances, it will be unfair and unjust to permit respondent No.2 to proceed with a complaint filed 16 years after the incident against the appellants.19. We accordingly, allow this appeal set aside the impugned order and quash the proceedings in Criminal Complaint Case No.1066 of 2008 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-II, Hardoi.


RESULT : Appeal allowed.

REFERENCES : -https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16050070/ -www.manupatra.com -www.aironline.in